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I. INTRODUCTION
The rule that an accrual basis taxpayer, engaged in the performance
of service contracts, may not defer income recognition of advance pay-
ments to the period when the services are to be rendered has perhaps been
among the most controversial in the field of tax law. Though writers' and
judges2 have vehemently opposed the prepaid income rule, the majority of
courts have gone along with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
extending it to the point where now only legislation can change it.' As a
result of three recent cases, the rule is now applicable to taxpayers
engaged in the sale of goods.'
* Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Research and
Writing for Freshmen; C.P.A. Certificate, State of Florida.
1. E.g., Alvin, "Prepaid Income": How the Commissioner Turned Liabilities into Income
under Section 446 of the 1954 Code, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 482 (1965); Behren, Schlude Holds
Prepaid Income Taxable on "Receipt"; Rationale is Uncertain, 18 J. TAXATION 194 (1963);
Gelfand, The "Claim of Right" Doctrine, 33 TAXES 726 (1955).
2. See, e.g., dissenting opinions in Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963);
American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commis-
sioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Hagan Advertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966).
3. Cooper, The Prepaid Income Snare: I.R.S. Is Extending Schlude Doctrine Even
Further, 24 J. TAXATION 339 (1966).
4. Fifth & York Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Ky. 1964); Hagan Adver-
tising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966) ; Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
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From a commercial accounting viewpoint of income recognition there
is no real difference between rendering services and selling goods. In both
situations, the income is earned at the time of performance." From a tax
accounting viewpoint, however, there is an inherent distinction due to the
"return of capital" concept embodied in our system of income taxation.
Although this distinction gives rise to constitutional considerations, up to
now they have been brushed aside on the theory that the rule laid down
by the United States Supreme Court6 pertaining to prepaid income for
future services is equally applicable to amounts received in advance for
the future delivery of goods."
This comment will analyze the constitutional aspects which should
be considered when applying the prepaid income rule to the sale of goods.
Some practical ways of dealing with the problem will also be explored.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 8
A. Statutory
1. THE CONFLICT: SECTION 446
The root of the conflict over the proper tax treatment of prepaid
income between the accounting profession and the taxpayer on one side
against the Commissioner and the courts on the other lies in the inter-
pretation of section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 That
section provides that "taxable income shall be computed under the method
of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his
income in keeping his books."' ° An exception is provided where the method
used by the taxpayer does not "clearly reflect income," in which case "the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.""
The Code12 specifically provides that the cash receipts and disbursements
method and the accrual method' 3 are both permissible in computing tax-
5. See Alvin, Tax Court Extends Prepaid Income Rules to Sales of Goods, 23 J. TAXA-
TioN 210 (1965).
6. Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 678 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
7. See cases cited note 4 supra.
8. For a detailed discussion of the history of the prepaid income rule, see Alvin, supra
note 1, at 483-493 and Behren, supra note 1, at 194-200.
9. All references are to the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a). The prior sources for this section are §§ 8(g)
and 13(d) of the Revenue Act of 1916 which indirectly authoiized the use of the accrual
basis for tax purposes.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c).
13. The primary distinction between the accrual and the cash methods of accounting
is that the accrual method identifies revenues and expense with specified periods of time
such as a month or year; whereas in the cash method, revenue and expense are recorded
in the books of account when received and paid without regard to the period to which
they apply. WixoN & KEL ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBoox, § 5.10 (4th ed. 1962). Reduced to its
simplest meaning as applied to income recognition, the accrual basis recognizes income when
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able income. The Code further clarifies which method of accounting is
to be used in recognizing income for tax purposes by providing that "any
item of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable
year in which received by the taxpayer, unless under the method of ac-
counting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly
accounted for as of a different period.
'14
At first blush it would appear that the taxpayer has the right to re-
port taxable income in the same manner that his accountant used to set
up his books and prepare his financial statements. The accountant, how-
ever, in interpreting the above provisions, does so in light of what has
been termed "generally accepted accounting principles." While these
"principles" do not represent any set of rigid rules, they do provide basic
standards which are used as guidelines by the accounting profession for
purposes of commercial accounting. "5 The "principle" which is of par-
ticular importance in determining when advance payments should be
taken into income is the one which requires that there be a periodic
matching of costs and revenues. 6 Basically, this means that revenues
should be matched as closely as possible against the expenses incurred
in earning them. Where this is not done, a distortion occurs in that in-
come is reported in one year and the corresponding expenses are reported
in another year. The net result, however, is the same when the operations
are viewed over the long run rather than isolated to one particular year.' 7
In terms of income recognition of advance payments for goods or ser-
vices, this periodic matching would require that the advance payments
be deferred until the period when the costs of earning them are incurred.
Ideally, that would be when the goods are delivered or when the particular
service is performed.
The conflict arises because as a general rule, accounting principles
are absorbed into the law of federal income taxation only where they are
found to fit within the general framework of the taxing statute, or where
they aid in securing uniformity of application. 8 Subject to certain modi-
fications, taxable income does follow commercial accounting principles
it is "earned" in contrast to the cash basis which recognizes income only upon its actual
or constructive receipt.
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 451(c) (emphasis added). The "method of accounting
used in computing taxable income" refers to the accrual basis or any other method permitted
by section 446(c). Section 461(a) sets out the general rule for the taking of deductions
by providing that "the amount of any deduction or credit .. .shall be taken for the taxable
year which is the proper taxable year under the method of accounting used in computing
income."
15. For a detailed discussion see WIXON & KELL, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK, § 1.9 (4th
ed. 1962).
16. Id., § 1.
17. The largest distortion occurs in the first and last years of existence since the first year
contains large income and little expense whereas the last year contains large expense and
little income.
18. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx § 5.03 (1958).
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to a large extent.1" It should be understood, however, that income for tax
purposes is to be determined by the statute and not by accounting prin-
ciples.2" Authority for this proposition may be found in the Code itself
which provides the Commissioner with broad discretion in determining
whether the accounting method used by the taxpayer does, in fact, "clearly
reflect income."'" As to a periodic matching of costs and revenue, it has
been noted that the Code does not lay down any broad principle that de-
ductions are to be related in all cases to the income earned by their ex-
penditure.22 "Any such principle would inevitably lead to hopeless con-
fusion and to the destruction of the basic general concept that there should
be an annual reckoning on the basis of the method of accounting used by
the Taxpayer."2
Another reason for the conflict between accounting principles and tax
accounting lies in the fact that sound accounting favors a conservative
approach to the inclusion of income and of deductions, whereas the policy
of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service is, ordinarily, to accelerate
income and defer deductions. 4
2. SECTIONS 452 AND 462
In an effort to resolve the conflict by bringing tax accounting more
into line with accepted business accounting, Congress enacted sections 452
and 462 in the 1954 Code. These sections provided expressly for deferral
of "prepaid income"25 and for allowances for estimated future expenses.26
The accountants had won a major victory since the accrual method of ac-
counting, as generally used for financial reporting purposes, now had Con-
gressional approval for use in computing taxable income. Unfortunately,
the victory was short-lived, because once the Treasury re-estimated the
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. INT. REv. COnE of 1954, § 446(b). For the limitations placed on the Commissioner's
discretion see MERTENS, supra note 18, at § 12.14:
The taxpayer's method of accounting is not controlling unless it clearly reflects
income . . . . But the discretion of the Commissioner in changing the method
claimed by the taxpayer is not unlimited. While the Code leaves much to the discre-
tion of the Commissioner, he is not free to act capriciously or arbitrarily, and he
may not, in deciding what clearly reflects income, sacrifice the facts to theory or
fiction.
In Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(b) (1957), the Commissioner apparently adopts generally accepted
accounting principles as the standard for determining whether a method of accounting
"clearly reflects income."
22. J. MERTENS, supra note 18, at § 12.23.
23. Id.
24. Id. The author notes that in an "ideal" accounting system it might well be that
taxable income would be determined by deducting from gross income the expenses actually
incurred in earning it. He points out, however, that niceties of accounting must frequently
yield to the need of revenue and a workable system of determining each year the amount
of taxable income.
25. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 452.
26. INT. RaV. CODE Of 1954, § 462.
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initial first year loss of revenue, Congress accepted their recommendation
to retroactively repeal the sections.17
The legislative intent behind the repeal has had an astounding impact
upon the subsequent shaping of the prepaid income rule by the courts. In
two of the leading Supreme Court cases28 the majority opinions relied
very heavily on an interpretation of the Congressional intent behind the
repeal, i.e. that the Commissioner could reject any accounting system
which deferred prepaid income. The dissenting opinions in these cases, in
consonance with other courts29 and writers,30 have interpreted the repeal
only as a Congressional intent to "re-establish the principles of law which
would have been applicable if sections 452 and 462 had never been en-
acted."'" Subsequent to the repeal of these sections, Congress has made
piecemeal attempts to reinstate section 452 of the 1954 Code by passing
legislation which allows deferral of prepaid income from subscriptions"2
and membership dues.3 As one writer has pointed out, this "fragmentary
approach to 'prepaid income' not only creates inconsistencies in tax treat-
ment among accrual basis taxpayers, but also falls short of decisively
resolving the problem.)
3 4
3. GROSS INCOME AND GROSS RECEIPTS DISTINGUISHED:
SECTION 61(a) AND THE RETURN
OF CAPITAL CONCEPT
If section 446 were the only Code provision involved, there would
be no doubt that advances received by the taxpayer for either goods or
services should be treated equally. The broad discretion given to the
Commissioner by that section would obviously enable him to require that
all advances, whether for goods or services, be included in gross income
and thus be given income recognition in the year of receipt. This approach,
however, which is the one that has been used by the courts to justify equal
treatment,3 5 completely ignores section 61(a) of the Code which defines
what is to be included in gross income.
27. Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, § 1(a), 69 Stat. 134.
28. Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
29. Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
30. Alvin, supra note 1; Behren, supra note 1; Sporrer, The Past and Future of Deferring
Income and Reserving for Expenses, 34 TAXEs 45 (1956).
31. See H.R. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955) ; S. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955)
1955-2 Cur. BULL. 852, 859.
32. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 455.
33. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 456. This section, in effect, nullifies the decisions in the
automobile club cases.
Three recent bills calling for the deferral of prepaid income from services to be rendered
in the future have all been defeated. H.R. 2245, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.R. 2440, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1961) ; H.R. 8688, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
34. Alvin, supra note 1, at 485.
35. See cases cited note 4, supra.
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From the outset it should be noted that there is a distinction between
gross receipts and gross income. Gross receipts corresponds to the total
sales price received for an item sold. Gross income, on the other hand,
represents the excess, if any, remaining after the cost of the item sold is
subtracted from the gross receipt. The subtraction of the cost enables
the vendor to recover his capital investment in the item sold, thereby
leaving a residue which constitutes his gross income. From this gross in-
come, deductions are made for other expenses incurred in making the sale,
leaving "taxable income" upon which the tax rate is then imposed. Thus,
while a taxpayer engaged in the sale of goods must deduct from gross
receipts his cost of goods sold to arrive at gross income, a taxpayer who
performs services does not have to make any deductions to arrive at gross
income. To him, gross receipts and gross income are synonomous3 6
Another distinction that should be observed is that between costs of
goods sold and "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. The latter
may be described as those expenses which are usually incurred as a re-
sult of doing business. Good examples of these are the selling and ad-
ministrative expenses which are incurred by nearly any business engaged
in the sale of goods or services. While the deduction for cost of goods
sold has been described as an essential one since it preserves the return
of capital concept,3" the deduction for "ordinary and necessary" expenses
of doing business has been said to be a matter of legislative grace which
Congress could either allow or disallow as it sees fit."8
In the context of a tax on income, the reason for the return of capital
rule is clear. If an amount sufficient to restore the taxpayer's capital
investment in the property sold is not allowed as a deduction from
gross receipts in arriving at gross income, then the tax is not one on income
but rather one imposed on both capital and income. Where a taxpayer
receives money in advance of the date when the goods are to be delivered
and attempts to defer income recognition by excluding it from gross
income, the Commissioner, by exercising his discretion, may require him
to include it in gross income for the taxable year in which it was received.
If the taxpayer was also allowed to deduct the cost of the items sold, he
would then be receiving the same treatment as one performing service
contracts who is required to include an advance payment in gross income
in the year of receipt. The justification for equal application of the
prepaid income rule is clear in this situation since both taxpayers are
being taxed only on their gross income. Although a distortion takes place
in that the expenses incurred in earning the income will not be deducted
until a later period, it is not really significant when considered from the
36. For a detailed discussion see J. MERTENS, supra note 18, at § 5.10.
37. E.g., Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952); Davis v. U.S., 87
F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937).
38. E.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Davis v. United States, 87
F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937).
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standpoint that Congress could conceivably disallow these deductions
altogether and apply the tax entirely on a gross income theory. 9
Assume, however, that no deduction were allowed for cost of goods
sold. Here the equal treatment theory breaks down, and the question pre-
sents itself whether the income tax can constitutionally be imposed on
gross receipts and thus on capital. The answer involves a determination
of the definition of the word "income" in the sixteenth amendment and
whether it sanctions an unapportioned tax on gross receipts. Before delv-
ing into the constitutional problem, however, a brief analysis of the judi-
cial background of the prepaid income rule will be helpful.
B. Judicial
1. PRE "SERVICE" CASES
Until recently the prepaid income rule had never been applied to
cases where goods or property were sold. The courts had refused to apply
the rule either on the basis that the advance constituted a form of loan,4°
or that the contracts involved were executory contingent contracts for
future sales.4 ' In the latter situations, the rationale applied was that gross
income could arise only from a sale, and until the sale was completed,
there could be no gross income. A careful reading of some of these cases
indicates that what the court really meant was that until the cost of the
goods or property sold could be determined and deducted from the ad-
vance payment, there was no gross income upon which to levy the tax.4 2
In other words, the courts were cognizant of the distinction between gross
receipts and gross income, and would not permit the amount received to
be taxed until the taxpayer was allowed to recoup his capital investment.
But in all three of the recent cases43 which held that the prepaid income
rule was applicable to goods, the courts completely brushed those cases
aside on the theory that the "service" cases were controlling.
2. THE "SERVICE" CASES
The first case in which the Supreme Court was squarely faced with
the prepaid income issue was in Automobile Club v. Commissioner.44 In
39. Id.
40. E.g., Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 829
(7th Cir. 1963) (financing agreements); Summit Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 983
(1930) (loan).
41. E.g., Lucas v. North Texas Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930) ; Watkins v. United States, 287
F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Virginia Iron & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir.
1938) ; Consolidated Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Bourne v. Com-
missioner, 62 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 650 (1933) ; Aiken v. Commis-
sioner, 35 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 16 T.C. 1067 (1951);
Veenstra & DeHaan Coal Co., 11 T.C. 964 (1948); Sophia M. Garretson, 10 B.TA. 1381
(1928).
42. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra & DeHaan Coal Co.,
11 T.C. 964 (1948).
43. See cases cited note 4, supra.
44. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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that case, the accrual basis taxpayer reported membership dues received
one year in advance ratably over the one year period of membership
rather than in the year received. The Commissioner contended that the
dues should be reported in the year of receipt, relying on the claim of
right doctrine. The Court sustained the Commissioner's contention, but
did so on the basis of the discretion given to the Commissioner by the
Code to determine whether the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly
reflects income.45 The Court found that the method of allocation of the
membership dues used by the taxpayer was purely artificial and bore no
relation to the services which it may have been called upon to render for
the members. This finding was based on the fact that the services were
to be performed solely on the demand of the members.
In American Automobile Association v. United States4" the Court
again held that an accrual basis automobile club must report membership
dues paid in advance in the year of receipt. In contrast to the Automobile
Club47 case, the taxpayer presented extensive proof that its method of
accounting whereby the membership dues were taken into income ratably
over the twelve-month membership period did clearly reflect income. The
Court noted that the record contained expert accounting testimony in-
dicating that the system used was in accord with generally accepted ac-
counting principles; that there was detailed proof of the cost of member-
ship service; and that the correlation between that cost and the period of
time over which the dues were credited as income was shown and justified
by actual experience. But the Court pointed out that the holding of the
Automobile Club case (that the system of accounting was "purely
artificial") was based on the finding that substantially all services were
performed only upon a member's demand and the taxpayer's performance
was not related to fixed dates after the tax year, and that this same fact
was also present in the case under review. The Court held that while
45. The Supreme Court has never applied the claim of right doctrine as the rationale for
the prepaid income rule. In Automobile Club the court held for the Commissioner based on
the discretion given to him by the Code to determine whether the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting clearly reflects income. The court found that the Commissioner had not abused his
discretion since the method used by the taxpayer was "artificial." The two other Supreme
Court decisions, American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) and Schlude v.
Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), were both decided on the basis of the discretion rule of
section 446 and the legislative intent behind the retroactive repeal of sections 452 and 462 of
the 1954 Code. The dissenting opinions in all three of these cases specifically noted that the
majority opinions were not based on the claim of right doctrine. See Alvin, supra note 1, at
458-493 for a more detailed discussion.
The claim of right doctrine is far from dead, however, as a basis for applying the prepaid
income rule. Several recent decisions from the lower federal courts indicate that the doctrine
is currently being used to support the prepaid income rule. Although the courts do not always
refer to the doctrine by name, use of terms such as "without restrictions" have obvious refer-
ence to the doctrine. See, e.g., Van Wagoner v. United States, 368 F.2d 95 (Ist Cir. 1966);
Parkchester Beach Club Corp. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1964; Hagan Ad-
vertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966); William 0. McMahon, Inc., 45 T.C. 221 (1965);
Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
46. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
47. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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income recognition of the advances ratably over two taxable years,
without regard to correspondingly fixed individual experience but con-
sistent with overall experience, did present an accurate image of the total
financial structure, such a method failed to respect the criteria of annual
tax accounting and could be rejected by the Commissioner.48
If the decision in American Automobile Association was based solely
on the finding that the "demand" aspect of the services caused the ac-
counting system to be purely artificial and thus did not clearly reflect
income, then it would appear that the door was still open for income de-
ferral of advance payment where the taxpayer could show that the ser-
vice was to be performed on a fixed date. But the Court's further reliance
on their interpretation of the Congressional intent behind the retroactive
repeal of sections 452 and 462 indicates conclusively that deferral of
prepaid income from service contracts will not be permitted under any
circumstances, regardless of the accounting system used by the taxpayer.49
Just two years later, the prepaid income problem was again before
the Supreme Court in the case of Schlude v. Commissioner.5 ° In that case,
the taxpayer operated a number of dance studios in which students often
paid for their lessons in advance by giving cash or negotiable notes due
in installments. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's accrual
method of accounting, which deferred the reporting of student advances
as income until they had been earned through the performance of the
related dance lessons or the lapse of the contract period, did not clearly
reflect income within the meaning of section 446, and included the cash
and the face value of the notes in gross income in the year received, as
well as the contract installments due and payable. The Court held that
Schlude was squarely controlled by American Automobile Association and
that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion in rejecting the tax-
payer's accrual accounting system. In so holding, the Court's rationale was
again based on the Congressional intent behind the retroactive repeal of
section 452 of the 1954 Code and on the fact that the services were ren-
dered solely on demand of the students as in the American Automobile
Association and Automobile Club cases.5
All three cases were split decisions, the latter two being decided by
a one vote margin. Mr. Justice Stewart, in writing the dissenting opinions
in both American Automobile Association and Schlude, forcefully argued
that the majority opinion had misinterpreted the Congressional intent be-
hind the retroactive repeal of section 452. He was of the opinion that the
48. American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691 (1961).
49. See E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448, 455 (1965), where the prepaid income rule was ap-
plied to a taxpayer who performed services which were not dependent on the demand or re-
quest of its clients, but rather were performed by the taxpayer as a matter of course during
the tax year.
50. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
51. Id. at 136.
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only consideration behind the repeal was the expectation by the Treasury
of an enormous loss of revenue, and that Congress intended that the repeal
would simply re-establish the principles of law which would have been
applicable if sections 452 and 462 had never been enacted.52 He further
felt that the accounting systems used by the taxpayers in both cases did
"clearly reflect income" and that the Commissioner had abused his dis-
cretion in rejecting them.
Subsequent to Schlude the lower courts have decided a number of
cases involving taxpayers engaged in the performance of service con-
tracts who have attempted to defer income recognition of advance receipts
either by excluding them from gross income,58 or by taking a deduction
for the estimated future expenses of performing the services. 4 In each
case, the courts have held for the Commissioner and required income rec-
ognition in the year of receipt. In answer to one taxpayer's attempt to
distinguish its situation from the American Automobile Association and
Schlude cases, the court stated that "there seems to be no escape from
the no-deferral rule of Schlude v. Commissioner and American Auto-
mobile Association v. United States."55 Indeed, as previously noted, it is
apparent that only legislation can change the law at this point.56
3. THE "SALE OF GOODS" CASES
The first case which held that the prepaid income rule was applicable
to the sale of goods was Fifth & York Co. v. United States.5 Here, an
accrual basis automobile dealer made "two for one" agreements whereby
purchasers of new cars at a price of about $400 higher than the regular
sales price were permitted to receive in the following year a new car in
even exchange, provided the buyer requested the exchange and that the
older car had suffered only normal wear and tear. The $400 was placed
in the taxpayer's bank account and used in the regular course of business.
One-half of the gross profits from the "two for one" sales was included
in income in the year when the exchange took place rather than the year
when the cash was received. The court rejected the taxpayer's attempt
to distinguish between the sale of services and goods and held that:
52. See notes 28-33 supra, and accompanying text.
53. E.g., Van Wagoner v. United States, 368 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1966) (insurance commis-
sions); Parkchester Beach Club Corp. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1964) (mem-
bership dues and locker fees) ; Decision Inc., 47 T.C. 5 (1966) (advertising fees) ; William 0.
McMahon, Inc., 45 T.C. 221 (1965) (subscription payments); E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448
(1965) (management service fees). But see Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 42 T.C. 419 (1964)
(finance charges on non-negotiable notes need not be included in income in the year the note
was received under the Schlude case).
54. E.g., Fredrick J. Villafranca v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1966) (dance
lessons) ; Bell Elec. Co., 45 T.C. 14 (1965) (repair contracts) ; Simplified Tax Records, Inc.,
41 T.C. 75 (1963) (accounting fees).
55. Decision, Inc. 47 T.C. 5 (1966).
56. See note 3, supra.
57. 234 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. Ky. 1964).
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[I]nasmuch as Congress has not expressly provided for deferral
of income from the sale of goods or personal property and in
view of the expression of the Supreme Court in Schlude, it is
concluded that the Commissioner properly exercised his dis-
cretion in allocating the entire profits from the "two for one"
sales to the [year when they were received] ."
The taxpayer did not attempt to argue the "return of capital" concept
which would have been applicable to the extent that no deduction was
allowable for the additional net cost of the second automobile until it was
determined whether the purchaser exercised his option in the following
year.
In Chester Farrara59 the Tax Court followed Fifth & York in ex-
tending the prepaid income rule to the sale of goods. In Farrara the tax-
payer formed "suit clubs" in which customers paid a fixed amount each
week for an agreed period of weeks. At the end of each week there was a
drawing under which one member would win a suit or other merchandise.
At the end of a stipulated period of time, the non-winning members re-
ceived a certificate which gave them the right to obtain merchandise equal
in amount to what they had paid into the "club." Members were not en-
titled to cash refunds, and if payments were discontinued during the term
of the agreement the member received a merchandise certificate in the
amount of the payments he had made up to that time. In rejecting the
attempted distinction between goods and services the court held that the
theory underlying the American Automobile Association and Schlude
cases was fully applicable, and that the payments must be included in
income when received by the taxpayer without restriction as to their use."
The most recent and by far most significant case that has held the
prepaid income rule applicable to the sale of goods is Hagen Advertising
Displays, Inc.61 The taxpayer, a manufacturer of advertising signs, re-
ceived advance payments from some of its larger customers under "blan-
ket orders" for a certain number of signs to be delivered at the direction
of each customer. Due to the system of accounting employed by the tax-
payer, there was no accurate way of determining from its books the cost
of the signs to be delivered in future years for which the advances had
been received. Being on the accrual basis of accounting, the taxpayer
properly did not include the advance payments in gross income until the
year in which the signs were actually delivered. At that time, a deduction
for the cost of the signs sold was also taken. 2
58. Id. at 423.
59. 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
60. The court was apparently referring to the claim of right doctrine. See note 45, supra.
61. 47 T.C. 139 (1966).




The significance of the decision lies in the fact that for the first time,
a taxpayer argued the distinction between gross receipts and gross income.
In an attempt to escape the no-deferral rule of Schlude and American
Automobile Association, the taxpayer contended that under section 61 (a),
the advance payments constituted gross receipts, but there could be no
gross income under that section until the cost of goods sold had been deter-
mined and deducted from the amounts received. In short, the taxpayer
took the position that the amounts received did not constitute gross in-
come under section 61 (a) until the year in which the signs were delivered
and a deduction for their actual cost taken.
In supporting the Commissioner's contention that the advance pay-
ments were includible in gross income in the year of receipt, the court
never directly answered the ultimate question posed by the taxpayer as to
whether or not the income tax could be applied to gross receipts under
section 61 (a) of the Code. The court concluded that the prepaid income
rule was applicable since tax accounting is required to be on an annual
basis, not a transactional basis, and there was nothing in the regulations
which required that an attempt be made to match the cost of a particular
purchase with the receipt from its sale.64 In addition, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court rule in Schlude and American Automobile Asso-
ciation applies likewise in cases such as this one involving contracts to
sell property. In answer to the taxpayer's final contention that because
its accounting method clearly reflected income the Commissioner was not
justified in changing it, the court held the Commissioner's exercise of the
broad discretion granted him under section 446 was not unsound in light
of the many cases which have sustained his rulings requiring accrual basis
taxpayers to include advances in income in the year of receipt.
In effect the court treated the question involved as one arising under
section 446(b) as to whether income may be deferred, instead of one
arising under section 61 (a) as to whether the amounts received even con-
stituted gross income in the first instance. Thus, the real holding of the
case is not clear. For example, does the case stand for the proposition
that there is no distinction between gross receipts and gross income, and
63. The taxpayer cited Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner,
317 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Watkins v. United States, 287 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Wood-
lawn Park Cemetery Co., 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); and Veenstra & DeHaan Coal Co., 11 T.C. 964
(1948), in support of his contention. The court distinguished the instant case by pointing out
that the cases relied on by the taxpayer involved "mere loans or restricted deposits." It is
noteworthy that neither the Watkins case nor the Woodlawn Park Cemetery case were de-
cided on that point, but rather on the basis that the contracts involved there were executory
contingent contracts to sell and thus constituted uncompleted transactions. The important
distinction between these cases and the Hagen case is that the advance payments in Hagen
were non-returnable in contrast to those in Watkins and Woodlawn Park Cemetery which
were returnable in the event the contracts were cancelled.
64. 47 T.C. 139 (1966). The court also stated that "the advance payments received by
petitioner from its customers were without restriction as to use or disposition and were in
fact used ... in its normal business operations" (emphasis added). By the use of this language,
the court was apparently referring to the claim of right doctrine. See note 45, supra.
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therefore that one's capital investment is now subject to income taxa-
tion? Or does it stand for the proposition that the burden of proving the
amount of capital return is on the taxpayer, and upon a failure to sustain
this burden, he may then be subjected to taxation on his gross receipts
and thus his capital? 65 Although the second interpretation is certainly a
more plausible one, this still would not help in situations where the cost
of the item could not be either accurately ascertained or reasonably esti-
mated. In this latter situation must the taxpayer then be permitted to
defer income recognition until the cost (or return of capital) can be
determined and a deduction taken?
It is submitted that the question as to whether a taxpayer, who is
required to include an advance payment in gross income in the year of
receipt, must also be permitted to recover his capital investment by tak-
ing a deduction for his cost of goods sold or else be permitted to defer
income recognition of the entire amount until a subsequent period is not
controlled by the Schlude or American Automobile Association cases.
Those cases dealt only with the question of whether, under section 61 (a),
gross receipts for personal services to be rendered represents gross income
immediately upon receipt, and there was no question that involved a
return of capital. The amounts received there were unquestionably items
of gross income in the year of receipt, and the only question involved was
whether such amounts could properly be deferred to subsequent periods
under sections 446 and 451 of the Code. In both cases it was held that the
deferral of such gross income did not "clearly reflect income." This pro-
vides no authority, however, for determining whether amounts which
represent a partial or perhaps even an entire return of capital constitute
gross income under section 61 (a) of the Code or "income" within the con-
text of the sixteenth amendment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The return of capital rule, although not specifically provided for by
either the sixteenth amendment or the Code, has long been recognized by
the courts as an essential aspect of calculating the gross income derived
from the sale of goods or property. This concept was first established by
the Supreme Court in the case of Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.66 where the
Court was confronted with the problem of defining "income" under the
then existing Revenue Act.67 In answer to the Commissioner's argument
that gross income was equivalent to gross receipts, the Court stated that:
There is no express provision that even allows a merchant to de-
duct the cost of goods that he sells, yet it is plain that by the true
65. The court noted that the taxpayer made no argument that either its cost of goods
sold or inventories were incorrectly computed.
66. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
67. The court was construing the definition of income in the Excise Tax Act of 1909. In
South Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918), it was held that the term "income" under the
Excise Tax Act of 1909 was the same as "income" under the Income Tax Act of 1913.
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intent and meaning of the act, the entire proceeds of a mere con-
version of capital assets were not to be treated as income .... In
order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the
amount of gain, if any, we must withdraw from the gross pro-
ceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value [of the
property] ."8
The Court went on to state that the definition of income imports "some-
thing entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of
taxation or as a measure of tax." 9
While the regulations specifically recognize the return of capital con-
cept by providing for a deduction for cost of goods in arriving at gross
income,7" the Commissioner has argued to the contrary on several occa-
sions. In each case the courts were unanimous in holding that under the
Code the taxpayer must be allowed to deduct his cost of goods sold and
thereby recover his capital investment.71 For example, in Lela Sullenger,72
the Tax Court held that:
Section 23 [corresponding to section 61(a) of the 1954 Code]
makes no provision for the cost of goods sold, but the Commis-
sioner has always recognized, as indeed he must to stay within
the Constitution, that the cost of goods sold must be deducted
from gross receipts to arrive at gross income. No more than gross
income can be subjected to income tax upon any theory. 3
A. The Hagen Decision Reexamined
While many cases have held that the definition of income under the
Code means gross income rather than gross receipts, 4 thereby recognizing
the return of capital concept, no case has directly held that to be the
definition of "income" under the sixteenth amendment. There is authority,
however, to the effect that the definition of income under the sixteenth
amendment likewise means gross income rather than gross receipts. 75
Therefore, an attempt to levy the income tax on gross receipts would not
68. 247 U.S. at 184.
69. Id. at 185.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1957):
In a manufacturing, merchandising, or mining business, gross income means the total
sales, less the cost of goods ...The cost of goods sold should be determined in ac-
cordance with the method of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer.
71. E.g., Burnett v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) ; Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smiet-
anka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); Commissioner
v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (Ist Cir. 1952) ; Rayburn E. Hahn, 30 T.C. 195 (1958), aff'd per
curiam, 271 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1959); Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Joseph W. Scales,
18 T.C. 1263 (1952); Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948). See also J. MERTENS, supra note
18, at §§ 4.07, 5.03, 5.06, 5.10.
72. 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
73. Id. at 1077.
74. See authorities cited note 71, supra.
75. E.g., Commissioner v. Guminski, 198 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v.
Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Olds, Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th
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be sustainable under the sixteenth amendment. The fact that a tax on
gross receipts, if found to be an excise rather than an unapportioned direct
tax, might be sanctioned by article I, section 8 of the original Constitu-
tion 7 6 is, of course, irrelevant in determining whether an income tax can
be imposed upon gross receipts representing at least a partial return of
capital. When the Hagen decision is viewed in this light, the ultimate
scope of its holding becomes clearer. Because of judicial interpretations
which have limited the definition of income to "gross" income,77 in both
the sixteenth amendment and the Code, the holding of the case cannot
properly be interpreted to mean that a taxpayer who receives an advance
payment for the sale of goods may in all cases be taxed on the gross
amount of the receipt without taking into consideration the portion that
represents a return of capital. In view of the fact that the taxpayer in
Hagen made no attempt to prove what portion of the advance payment
constituted a return of capital and demanded no deduction for it,78 the
only reasonable interpretation of the decision is that the taxpayer has the
initial burden of proving what portion of the advance payment constitutes
a return of capital, and upon a failure to carry that burden, the taxpayer
may then be taxed on his gross receipts notwithstanding the fact that part
of it may actually represent a return of capital. Therefore, where the tax-
payer can prove with reasonable certainty his cost of goods sold with
respect to the advance payment under consideration, he should be allowed
to deduct it, thereby subjecting him to taxation only upon his gross in-
come. It should be noted that the prepaid income rule still applies here
since the income portion of the advance payment is being taxed in the
year of receipt; only the extent of its application is being limited.
B. The Logan Doctrine
As to the problem where the taxpayer cannot possibly determine
what portion of the advance payment represents a return of capital, the
Supreme Court has already indirectly established the applicable rule. In
Burnet v. Logan7" the taxpayer sold her stock in a mining company to
a steel manufacturer who made a cash payment and agreed to pay her
Cir. 1952) ; Jones v. Herber, 198 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076
(1948); R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INComE, 347-368 (rev. ed. 1945); J. MERTENS, supra note 18,
at § 4.07.
This principle is succinctly set out in J. MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, § 61-121:1:
A return of capital or of an investment is not income in the constitutional sense, and,
until the capital element has been returned or some provision made for its recovery,
generally no income is realized. Consequently, gross receipts, prior to an allowance
for cost of goods sold, are not taxable, although the amount which results after such
allowance-gross income-represents income which constitutionally may be taxable
without the deductions allowable therefrom by legislative grace.
76. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904); Commissioner v. Weis-
man, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion) ; Penn. Mut. Indem. Co., 32 T.C. 653
(1959) ; J. Mertens, supra note 18, at § 4.07.
77. See notes 71 and 75, supra.
78. See note 65, supra.
79. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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annually thereafter a specified amount for each ton of ore received. The
Commissioner assigned a market value to the future obligations and
apportioned the initial and all subsequent payments between capital and
income. The taxpayer argued that none of the payments to her constituted
gross income until she had recovered her capital investment in the prop-
erty sold. The Court found that the value assigned to the future payments
by the Commissioner was based on pure conjecture and that the market
value of these payments was actually unascertainable. In holding that the
taxpayer had "properly demanded the return of her capital investment
before assessment of any taxable profit based on pure conjecture,1
80
the Court restated the principle espoused in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros."A
that the taxpayer must be allowed to recover his capital before there can
be'any income upon which to levy the tax.
Although there are factual distinctions between our problem and the
Logan case in that the former involves a situation where the total proceeds
are known but the cost is unascertainable, and the latter involves a
reverse situation, the net result is identical since the amount received is
not apportionable between capital and income in either case. Therefore,
the same rule should apply in both situations. There is authority to the
effect that it does. For example, in the analagous situation where a
mixed aggregate of assets is acquired for a lump sum in one transaction
and subsequently disposed of a portion at a time, the rule is now well
settled that an allocation of the cost or other basis of the several units
need not be made where apportionment would be wholly impracticable
or impossible and the taxpayer is permitted to fully recover his capital
investment before gross income will arise.8 2 It is said that "this principle
is based upon the equitable doctrine that a taxpayer should not be
charged with gain on pure conjecture unsupported by reasonably ascer-
tainable facts."18 3 Likewise, where the taxpayer cannot reasonably ascer-
tain what portion of an advance payment constitutes a return of capital,
he should be permitted to defer taking it into gross income until such
time as a reasonable determination can be made. Here, the prepaid income
rule should have absolutely no application.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Use of Accounting Systems and Estimates
Since the burden is on the taxpayer to prove what portion of an
advance payment represents a return of capital, this section will be de-
voted to exploring the various methods of carrying this burden. Whether
80. Id. at 413.
81. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
82. E.g., Warren v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Raytheon Prod. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Kirkland
v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Inaja Land Co., 9 T.C. 727 (1947) ; Nathan Blum,
5 T.C. 702 (1945); William T. Piper, 5 T.C. 1104 (1945).
83. J. MERT rS, supra note 18, at § 38.25. The author notes that it is only the exceptional
situation where an allocation of the cost price cannot be made.
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any accounting system can be successfully used to accurately determine
his cost of goods sold depends on the particular circumstances of the
taxpayer. It is obvious that a fairly simple system would be appropriate
where the taxpayer purchases ready-made goods for resale. In contrast,
a far more sophisticated cost system would be needed where the taxpayer
himself manufactures the goods. This is because there are various ele-
ments of raw material, labor, and overhead to account for in calculating
the total costs involved. As a practical matter, whether any system could
be devised and effectively used depends to a great extent upon the state
of physical completion of the merchandise at the end of the taxable year.
For example, where the items for which the advance payment was re-
ceived are fully completed, there is no question that some accounting
method could be developed to accurately determine their cost. However,
where the items are only partially completed or perhaps not even yet in
existence, only a standard cost accounting system could be used to
directly ascertain their cost upon completion.84 Because of the large
expense involved, a standard cost system may not be feasible in many
cases. This does not mean that the use of accounting must be entirely
ruled out in this situation because if an adequate (although non-standard)
system is in use for cost accounting purposes it could also be used to
indirectly determine the cost of these items by means of an estimate.
Thus, the completed cost of the goods could be determined with a high
degree of accuracy by comparing them to identical or very similar goods
whose cost has already been developed by the accounting system.
Another situation in which an estimate could be used to prove the
cost of goods sold is where the taxpayer's gross profit (or gross margin)
on his sales remains fairly constant from year to year. In this case, the
average gross profit percentage for a given number of prior years could
be applied to the advance payment to determine the portion representing
a return of capital. For example:
The X Company's gross profit percentage (sales minus cost of
goods sold divided by sales) for the past five years has been
50%. They receive a $100,000 advance payment from the Y
Company for goods to be delivered in the following tax year,
and the Commissioner seeks to include the entire $100,000 in
gross income in the year of receipt. The taxpayer should be
allowed to prove that only $50,000 ($100,000 X 50%) is in-
cludible in gross income, since the remaining $50,000 represents
a return of capital.
84. A standard cost accounting system is one that establishes the cost of goods in ad-
vance of production by means of scientific fact finding which utilizes both past experience and
controlled experiment. Through the use of standards, it is possible to determine not only how
much a product costs but how much it should cost, and the causes of excess costs. See WiXON
& KELL, AcCOUNTANT's HANDBOOK, §§ 6.10-6.14 (4th ed. 1962). A standard cost accounting
system could be used to predetermine the cost of goods sold with a high degree of accuracy.
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The use of a reasonable estimate should not be objectionable for lack
of preciseness since many deductions provided for by the Code are also
based on estimates. Specific examples include depreciation, 85 unstated
interest,"6 and bad debt deductions, 7 to name but a few. 8 While the
courts have been reluctant to permit deductions for future estimated ex-
penses except in certain limited circumstances, 89 this should not be deter-
minative of whether a deduction for cost of goods sold should be allowed
based on an estimate. In fact, one taxpayer was allowed a deduction for
cost of goods sold computed by an estimate based on the then existing
Cohan RuleY° Of course, if an estimate would be purely arbitrary, or
based on surmise or speculation, the taxpayer should then be allowed to
defer income recognition of the entire advance payment.91
A technical discussion of the various accounting methods available
is beyond the scope of this paper. The point is, however, that the taxpayer
should seek the aid of a competent accountant to help design and put
into effect an adequate accounting system which will enable him to
carry the burden of proving what portion of any advance payment con-
stitutes a return of capital.
B. Avoiding the Prepaid Income Rule
There are certain situations where the taxpayer, by means of some
advance tax planning, may avoid the prepaid income rule altogether. One
possibility would be to have the advance payment take the form of a
loan or financing agreement. In this situation, the courts have held that
the advance does not constitute gross income under section 61 (a) and
85. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167. The useful life of the asset is based on an estimate.
86. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 163(b), 483.
87. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166(c). This section allows as a deduction for bad debts
a "reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts."
88. Any computation based on "fair market value" is nothing more than an estimate of
the true value. Basing the deduction for cost of goods sold on an estimate is really no different
than the problem involved where an aggregate of assets is purchased for a lump sum in one
transaction and subsequently disposed of a portion at a time. In the latter situation, an
allocation of the total cost or other basis is made to the several units sold where such appor-
tionment is possible, and the taxpayer is taxed in the year of sale rather than when the entire
capital investment is recovered. See note 82, supra and accompanying text. It is obvious that
the allocation is a mere estimate in most cases.
89. Compare Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Hilinski
v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1956); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722
(5th Cir. 1956); Pacific Grape Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955);
Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951), all allowing the deduction, with
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 367 U.S. 906 (1961), on remand, 293 F.2d 628 (1961),
and Ralph Patch, 19 T.C. 189, aff'd, 208 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1953), which denied the deduc-
tion. See also J. MERTENS, supra note 18, at §§ 12.61, 12.118.
90. Nathan Goldsmith, 31 T.C. 56 (1958). The Commissioner had included receipts from
unrecorded sales in gross income. Although the exact cost of the goods sold could not be
determined, the court allowed an offsetting adjustment for cost of goods sold determined
under the Cohan Rule.
91. See notes 79-83, supra and accompanying text.
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hence is not subject to taxation in the year received. 2 A caveat is in order
here since such a plan might be subject to a "substance over form" argu-
ment by the Commissioner. In this area, the Consolidated-Hammer95 and
Summit Coal 4 cases should be carefully analyzed.
The line of cases holding that advance payments for the sale of goods
on executory or contingent contracts to sell do not constitute gross income
in the year of receipt are still good law.9" Thus, if acceptance of the
goods is conditioned upon satisfactory inspection by the buyer, it would
appear that any advance payment for them could be deferred until actual
inspection and acceptance had taken place. A similar result should obtain
where the contract specifically allows either party to rescind and back out
of the deal.9
There are also many practical factors to be considered. For instance,
the relative bargaining power of the taxpayer with respect to contract
terms and his willingness to accept the financial risks inherent in placing
contingencies in the contract are both crucial aspects that cannot be
overlooked in tax planning.
Another planning device, while not avoiding the prepaid income rule,
would limit the extent of its application to gross income by guaranteeing
a deduction for cost of goods sold. This would be to have title to the
goods pass to the seller upon entering into the contract of sale. The
regulations97 specifically provide that:
Merchandise should be included in the inventory only if title
thereto is vested in the taxpayer. Accordingly, the seller should
include in his inventory goods under contract for sale but not
yet segregated and applied to the contract . . . but should ex-
clude from inventory goods sold ... title to which has passed to
the purchaser.
Thus, even though the taxpayer would have to include the advance
payment in gross income in the year of receipt, he would be. allowed a
92. J. MERTENS, supra note 18, at § 5.12.
93. Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 829 (7th
Cir. 1963).
94. Summit Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930).
95. See cases cited note 41, supra.
96. J. MERTENS, supra note 18, at § 12.125:
The execution of a sales contract which definitely fixes the liabilities of the parties
generally determines the time when a sale is made. But a sale premised upon satis-
factory tests in operation by the purchaser will not be considered consummated until
the property is accepted after the tests or expiration of the test period. Where
amounts are paid to a vendor in advance of a sale to be applied on the purchase
price, contingent upon the consummation of the sale, the gain on the sale is taxable
in the year the sale is completed and not in the earlier year when the contract is
made and the advance payments received.
The author also distinguishes between an executory contract to sell and a contract of sale of
property. The determining factor is the intent of the parties. Id. at § 12.118.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958).
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corresponding deduction for his cost of goods sold by virtue of the fact
that these goods would be excluded from his ending inventory.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the three decisions9" which have held that the pre-
paid income rule as set out in Schlude and American Automobile Associa-
tion is equally applicable to the sale of goods, it is submitted that such
an application is severely limited by the return of capital concept. Any
application of the rule that completely ignores this concept would appear
extremely tenuous in view of the constitutional and statutory considera-
tions which, hopefully, this paper has brought to light. This writer is of
the opinion that the Supreme Court would also take this position if
and when they are confronted with the question. Of course, there is
always the possibility that Congress will take the initiative in this area by
again passing legislation similar to that contained in section 452 of the
1954 Code to allow all taxpayers to defer income recognition of advance
payments.9 In the meantime, taxpayers may deal with the problem by
either planning to avoid it completely, or by at least limiting the applica-
tion of the rule to gross income by being prepared to prove what portion
of the advance payment constitutes a return of capital. Until Congress
passes appropriate legislation, however, even taxpayers engaged in the
sale of goods cannot completely escape the prepaid income rule except
where it appears that there is no possible way of ascertaining the portion
that represents a return of capital. In this situation, the Logan'00 doctrine
would appear to require that the taxpayer be permitted to defer income
recognition until a subsequent period when the portion constituting a
return of capital can be determined and a deduction for it taken.
98. Fifth & York Co. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Ky. 1964); Hagen Ad-
vertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966) ; Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
99. In S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., 3 (1955), the Senate Committee on Finance,
in recommending the retroactive repeal of sections 452 and 462 of the 1954 Code, stated that:
[t]he present status, where some taxpayers are able to defer prepaid income which
others are not, is inequitable and should not be allowed to continue. In order to
eliminate this uncertainty and discrimination, definite rules must be written into the
income tax law. For these reasons your committee plans to begin studies in the near
future to devise proper substitutes for the sections now being repealed.
Unfortunately, the "near future" has turned out to be 12 years with no end in sight.
100. See notes 79-83, supra and accompanying text.
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